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Abstract 
Exploiting a district level data set on the 2007/8 post-election violence in Kenya, this 
paper investigates why polarization between ethnic groups results in violent conflict in 
some cases, but not in others. After the announcement of highly controversial election 
results in December  2007, ethnic-based violence erupted in many parts of Kenya. 
Violence occurred more often and with  greater intensity  in areas characterized by a 
high level of  polarization between the Kikuyu ethnic group and other  ethnic 
communities. At the same time, in several districts with a very high level of Kikuyu-non-
Kikuyu polarization, only few and sporadic incidences of violence occurred. The paper 
attempts to explain why in areas with similar levels of ethnic polarization, a flawed 
election process produced so different reactions. Results suggest that the main triggers 
of ethnic violence were poverty, unemployment among young males, and deteriorating 
public services. On the other hand, there is little evidence that clashes resulted from 
land inequality, land pressure or political competition. 
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Twenty six years after the publication of Donald Horowitz’ seminal book, “Ethnic Groups in Conflict”, 
ethnic violence remains a central issues on the international agenda, as exemplified by recent events 
in Kyrgyzstan, Darfur, Cote d’Ivoire and elsewhere. Yet at the same time the observation made by 
Fearon and Laitin (1996), that most ethnic groups, most of the time live in peace with each other, 
remains valid. This paper exploits a data set in on the incidence and intensity of violence following 
the 2007/8 elections in Kenya to investigate why tensions between ethnic groups sometimes, but 
not always, lead to violent conflict.  
 
Following the announcement of highly controversial election results in Kenya on December 30
th, 
2007, intense fighting broke out in many different parts of the country. The violence followed a clear 
ethnic pattern, as it mostly pitted members of the Kikuyu tribe against members of different tribes 
from Western and Coastal Kenya.
2
Although the conflict in Kenya should not be classified as a “civil war”, the paper is nevertheless 
related to the large literature on cross-country differences in the onset and duration of civil war, 
summarized in Collier and Hoeffler (2007) and Blattman and Miguel (2010). The effects of ethnic 
diversity have been studied intensely in this literature. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) and Fearon and 
Laitin (2003) used the ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) index and found no robust, monotonous 
relationship between ethnic diversity and the incidence and duration of  civil war  (Collier and 
Hoeffler report an inverse-U shaped relationship). On the other hand, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 
 The key observation made in this paper is that, while the bulk of 
violence occurred in areas that were polarized between Kikuyus and non-Kikuyus, other areas with a 
very similar ethnic composition experienced little or no violence. In other words, similar levels of 
ethnic polarization led to violence in some areas but not, or to a much lesser extent, in others. The 
paper exploits a district level data set to investigate why this variation in levels of violence occurred. 
Results show that ethnic violence was triggered by poverty, unemployment among young males, and 
decrease in access to essential, public services (in particular, access to piped water). Somewhat 
surprisingly, we find little evidence that ethnic clashes  were  triggered by land inequality, land 
pressure or political competition 
                                                           
1 We are grateful for very useful comments and other inputs from Anne Christensen, Jørgen Elklit, Markus 
Goldstein, Jane Kabubo-Mariara, Kawawa Masumba Kilango, Samuel Kipruto and Johan Mistiaen. We thank 
the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics for generously providing access to household survey data. All 
remaining errors are our own. 
2  In East Africa, the word “tribe” is typically used instead of “ethnic group” and is not derogatory. 3 
 
(2005) argued that conflict is not driven by fractionalization (the coexistence of many, relatively 
small groups) but rather by polarization (the coexistence of a few groups of similar size) and found a 
significant, positive effect of polarization on the probability of a country experiencing civil war. In 
contrast with these studies, the present paper does not ask whether but when ethnic diversity leads 
to violent conflict. In this regard it resembles Sambanis (2001) who also investigated the specific 
drivers of ethnic-, as opposed to “revolutionary” or other types of wars. 
 The paper contributes to the small, but growing group of studies that exploit intra-country 
variation in civil conflict to conduct quantitative analyses of the determinants of war and civil strife 
(Deininger 2003, Mancini 2008, Barron, Kaiser and Pradhan 2009, Murshed and Gates 2005, Do and 
Iyer 2010, Hattlebak 2010). The paper most closely related to ours is the contribution by Dercon and 
Gutierrez-Romero (2010), who exploit a household level data set to investigate the triggers of the 
2007/8 post-election violence in Kenya. They find that households who experienced land disputes 
before the election, live in places where “gangs connected to politics” are active, or reside in urban 
areas, are more likely to report being exposed to the post-election violence than others. The present 
study, conducted at the district level, complements Dercon and Gutierrez-Romero’s paper, both 
because studies at different levels of aggregation each have distinct advantages, and because the 
variables included in the analyses are quite different. For example, Dercon and Gutierrez-Romero 
use a different measure of ethnic diversity than we do and do not include measures of 
unemployment and public service provision, both key variables in this study. The key question asked 
here, why did Kikuyu-non-Kikuyu ethnic polarization lead to much more violence in some areas than 
in others, is not asked by Dercon and Gutierrez-Romero. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents background information about ethnic and 
political violence in Kenya and about the 2007 elections, the post-election violence and its 
aftermath. Section 3 discusses theory and presents hypotheses to be tested. Section 4 describes the 
data set and section 5 shows descriptive statistics and discusses the estimation strategy. Section 6 
presents regression results. The robustness of main results to the influence of outliers, spill-over 
effects between neighboring districts, choice of regression estimator and other factors are explored. 





2.  Background 
2.1 Ethnicity and political violence in Kenya  
Compared with its neighbors to the East, North and West (Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda), 
Kenya has been an oasis of calm for most of its independent history. However, ethnic and political 
violence was never completely absent. During colonial times, Kikuyus from central Kenya waged the 
famous Mau-Mau rebellion against British rule (1952-1959). The rebellion was to a large extent 
motivated by the desire to regain land confiscated for European settlement. It led to the internment 
of more than 100,000  Kikuyus and other native Kenyans  in camps, the nature of which was 
compared by Elkins (2005) to the Gulags of Josef Stalin. 
From Independence in 1963, Kenyan politics was dominated by the influence of ethnicity. 
Edward Miguel (2004) has compared the nation-building efforts of Tanzania’s Founding Father, Julius 
Nyerere, with the lack of such efforts by Jomo Kenyatta, the first president of Kenya. For example, 
Nyerere promoted Swahili as a national language in Tanzania, while vernacular languages have 
retained a much stronger role in Kenya. Also, school curricula have been employed to emphasize 
national identity to a much larger extent in Tanzania than in Kenya. 
At the same time, Kenya is so ethnically fragmented that inter-ethnic coalition building is 
always a necessary component of  a strategy to secure a stable power base. The most numerous 
ethnic group, the Kikuyus,  comprise only about 17  percent of the population. Other important 
groups include the Luo and the Kisii, mainly inhabiting Nyanza province on the brinks of Lake Victoria 
(see Figure 1); the Luhya, who are most numerous in Western province; the Kalenjin, Maasai, 
Turkana and Samburu, who regard different parts of Rift Valley province as their “ancestral 
homelands”; The Meru and Embu who share important characteristics with the Kikuyu and inhabit 
the  central parts of Eastern province; the Kamba who dominate the Southern parts of Eastern 
province; and the Mijikenda who are numerous in coastal areas (See Ng’ang’a 2006 for detailed 
descriptions of each group).  
The three presidents of independent Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel Arap Moi and Mwai Kibaki, 
have based their power on shifting, ethnic alliances. Up to 1991, Kenya was de-facto a one-party 
state, ruled by the Kenya African National Union (KANU). The most important instances of political 
violence during this period were the assassinations of leading opposition figures such as Pio Gama 
Pinto, Tom Mboya, Robert Ouko and J.M. Kariuki. In 1969, an significant episode of ethno-political 
fighting occurred when Kenyatta supporters clashed with supporters of Luo leader Jaramogi Oginga 
Odinga in Kisumu, a town in Western Kenya, resulting in 11 fatalities and many injuries. In 1991, 
under heavy pressure from external donors, President Moi grudgingly agreed to introduce multi-5 
 
party democracy. This, in combination with Moi’s fragile power base, consisting primarily of the 
Kalenjin and other Rift Valley communities, arguably led to the rise of ethno-political violence in the 
1990s. In the run-ups to the 1992 and 1997 elections, groups loyal to President Moi, especially in the 
Rift Valley, systematically used violence to prevent likely opposition voters from casting their ballots 
(Kimenyi and Ndung’u 2005). In practical terms, the likelihood of voting for the opposition was to a 
large extent determined by ethnicity and consequently the victims of violence were mostly Kikuyus 
and members of other groups who have migrated to the Rift Valley in the decades prior to and after 
Independence. 
In 2002, Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, formed a coalition spanning a broad range of groups, including 
Kikuyus, Luos, Luhyas and others, organized in the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) party. Moi 
was not running. Instead, Uhuru Kenyatta, another Kikuyu and son of Jomo Kenyatta, was at the top 
of the KANU ticket. Kikabi campaigned on a platform of anti-corruption and reform and won in a 
landslide. 
 
2.2  The 2007 elections 
After the 2002 election, the multi-ethnic coalition behind Kibaki and the NARC movement 
disintegrated. Kibaki was perceived by some to be reverting to the bad old ways of Kenyan politics 
by relying heavily on his powerbase of Kikuyu, Meru and Embu support (see e.g. Mueller 2008, 
Wrong 2009).
3
However, in comparison with the episodes in 1992 and 1997, there was relatively little 
political violence before the 2007 elections. Voting proceeded in a largely peaceful manner on 
December 27
th. Election results were released gradually. The first results showed a strong lead for 
Odinga in the race for president. As more results arrived however, the lead narrowed, and when the 
final results were announced on December 30
th they showed a narrow win for the incumbent, Mwai 
Kibaki. Hours after the announcement of this highly controversial outcome, Kibaki was sworn in as 
President in a ceremony witnessed only by a few political backers and not broadcast on television. In 
 A new political force emerged, namely the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), 
headed by Raila Odinga, a Luo and son of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. The ODM gathered prominent 
leaders from the Luhya, Kalenjin, Maasai and other communities. In response, Kibaki formed a new 
party, the Party of National Unity (PNU). In the run-up to the 2007 elections, both ODM and PNU 
subtly appealed to ethnic identity and ethnic prejudice. Opinion polls taken before elections reveal 
strong correlations between ethnicity and voting intentions (Kimenyi and Gutierrez-Romero 2008).  
                                                           
3 In particular, Kibaki reneged on a “Memorandum of Understanding” he had signed with coalition partners. 
The memorandum was widely perceived as implying that Luo Leader Raila Odinga was to be nominated for a 
newly established post of Prime Minister. 6 
 
a press conference on January 1
st, 2008,  chairman  of the Election Committee, Samuel Kivuitu, 
acknowledged that irregularities had occurred and, stunningly, admitted that he did not know for 
sure who had actually won the election. 
 
2.3  The post election violence 
Immediately after the announcement of the Presidential election results, violence erupted almost 
simultaneously in a number of different locations. In Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu and other urban 
centers, angry mobs took to the streets. The police reacted to these activities with fierce use of force  
and killed a large number of persons, especially in Kisumu town. In the multi-ethnic slums of Nairobi, 
ethnic-based fighting erupted and more than a 100 persons were killed. In rural areas and towns of 
the Rift Valley and other provinces, militias were organized to attack the settlements of ethnic 
groups perceived as rivals. Most violence was of a “low-tech” nature, conducted mostly with 
machetes (known in East Africa  as “pangas”), clubs, bows and arrows. Only the police made 
significant use of firearms.  
Between 300,000 and 600,000 persons were displaced as a result of the post-election 
violence. More than 1,100 persons were killed. By the definition applied by some studies (more than 
1,000 battle deaths per year) this arguably places the conflict in the “civil war” category. However, 
the conflict fails to meet several of the more stringent, and more reasonable, criteria for civil wars 
established by Sambanis (2004). For example, Sambanis requires that “the parties are politically and 
militarily organized, and they have publicly stated political objectives” (p. 829). This was not the case 
in Kenya. Therefore, we do not refer to the post-election violence as a civil war. Nevertheless, 
comparisons between the results presented here and those from studies of the  incidence and 
severity of civil wars remain highly relevant. 
 
2.4  Settlement and aftermath 
Throughout the conflict, the international community focused intensely on the violence in Kenya. A 
United Nations peace mission headed by former UN secretary general, Kofi Annan, backed by the 
influential community of aid donors, agitated for putting a halt to the violence and attempted to 
promote negotiations between government- and opposition leaders. In early March 2008, these 
efforts finally bore fruit, as the parties reached an agreement to form a coalition government. Kibaki 
retained the Presidency but a new post of Prime Minister was invented and this office was taken by 
Odinga. The number of ministers and vice-ministers was expanded significantly and seats shared 
between candidates from both sides. After this, the violence abated. 7 
 
The settlement also called for inquiries into, respectively,  election irregularities and post-
election violence (see below), and for land- and constitutional reform. The call for constitutional 
reform has now been answered. In a 2010 referendum, Kenyans adopted a new constitution, which, 
among other things, is intended to strengthen local government and impose constraints on the 
hitherto extremely powerful presidency. Time will tell whether these measures are sufficient to 
prevent future recurrence of large-scale ethnic and political violence.  
The sections below describe various aspects of the post-election violence in more detail. For 
more extensive accounts of the violence and its background, see for example Waki (2008) and the 
2008 special issue of the Journal of Eastern African Studies (e.g. the articles therein by Cheeseman, 
and by Mueller). 
 
3.  Potential determinants of post-election violence 
3.1  Greed and grievance 
One powerful, conceptual framework for understanding the determinants of violent, civil conflict 
was advanced by Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004). They argue that violent conflicts may either 
result from “grievances”, for example related to economic inequality, discrimination, or political 
exclusion, or from the “greed” of opportunistic, political entrepreneurs, who organize violence if this 
provides the shortest way to power and wealth. In cross-country analyses of the onset and duration 
of civil wars, Collier and Hoeffler find that factors most obviously related to greed are more robustly 
correlated with the incidence of civil war than factors most obviously related to grievance. They 
conclude that the opportunity to finance and conduct a successful rebellion is the most important 
factor determining whether or not a country experiences civil war. Similar conclusions are reached 
by Fearon and Laitin (2003).  
We exploit the greed-or-grievance conceptual framework, but apply a somewhat different 
perspective than Collier and Hoeffler. In particular, Collier and Hoeffler regard  ethnic 
fractionalization as a factor “most obviously related to grievances”, and consider it as a potential 
determinant of civil wars, alongside other potential factors. In the Kenyan case, we conclude that 
ethnic polarization between certain groups was obviously a key factor determining the severity of 
the 2007-8 conflict. The task we set ourselves is to determine why the effect of ethnic polarization 
was much more devastating in some areas than in others. The paper searches for the factors 
facilitating the outbreak of ethnic conflict. These factors are grouped according to the 
greed/grievance dichotomy.  8 
 
 
3.2  Grievances 
Two major, potential sources of group grievance in Kenya are a) land issues, and b) struggles over 
access to state expenditure. As a  predominantly agricultural economy with a rapidly expanding 
population, the pressure on agricultural land resources in Kenya is severe. Furthermore, the history 
of land relations since colonial times has given rise to strong inter-ethnic tensions related to land, 
especially in the Rift Valley. In pre-colonial times, the Rift Valley was primarily populated by Maasai, 
Kalenjin and other, smaller communities. During British rule, large areas were expropriated for 
European settlement. They were included in the so-called “White Highlands”, which covered large 
parts of what is now Rift Valley and Central provinces. Around the time of Independence, the bulk of 
the White Highlands shifted back into Kenyan hands. However, many buyers of land and 
beneficiaries of government operated settlement schemes, such as the Million Acre Scheme, were 
from communities not indigenous to the Rift Valley. A large number of these outsiders were Kikuyus. 
First, through their closer association with the British colonialists, the Kikuyu were more comfortable 
with modern, capitalist modes of economic activity, such as commercial land transactions, than the 
people of the Rift Valley were. Second, the Kikuyu wielded dominant political and economic power 
at the center in Nairobi. As touched upon in section 2, the Kikuyu community had suffered bitterly as 
a result of the crack-down on the Mau-May rebellion during colonial the era. This generated a 
feeling of entitlement to compensation in the minds of some Kikuyus, such as the former Mau-Mau 
fighters. Third, many Kikuyus had worked in the Rift Valley as staff on the European farms. Around 
the time of Independence, some  farms were simply given, or sold cheaply,  from the European 
farmer to his most trusted African employee. Hence, Kikuyus and other immigrants in the Rift Valley 
generally believe that their families have obtained land through legitimate means. Among the 
communities that consider themselves natives of the area, on the other hand, an important view has 
been that the settlers were trading in “stolen goods”, since the  British had originally paid no 
compensation for occupying the White Highlands. Stolen goods, of course, should be returned to 
their rightful owners (see e.g. Leo 1984, Kanyinga 2009). 
Grievances related to land are proxied in this study by two variables. First, a measure of land 
inequality is introduced (see below for data sources). The gini coefficient of agricultural land holdings 
among households in rural areas is used. A drawback of this measure is that no information is 
included about “horizontal inequalities”, that is, the correlation between land holdings and ethnic 
background (Stewart 2002).  Presumably, land inequality is a more potent source of conflict if, for 
example, the largest farms are owned disproportionately by ethnic “outsiders”. Such data is not 9 
 
available since individual level data on ethnicity is not included in the survey that collected data on 
land. Second, a measure of rural population density is used.  
 Important grievances are also related to the distribution of public expenditure. Citizens 
depend on the government for the provision of a number of essential, public goods, such as water, 
sanitation, electricity, roads, schools, clinics and hospitals. The limited financial resources of the 
government mean that coverage for all these goods is far from universal. Qualitative as well as 
quantitative evidence suggests that the distribution of government spending is determined to a 
large extent by ethno-political factors (e.g. Burgess et al. 2009). We assume that frustration is more 
likely to result from absolute or relative decline in access to public goods than from low levels of 
service provision. Absolute levels of service standards represent the cumulated effect of public 
investment decisions over many years. On the other hand, the change in access to services 
experienced over recent years is directly linked to the policies of current and recent governments. 
Even if a group has lower access to public goods than other groups, it is unlikely to react aggressively 
to this state of affairs if it is currently experiencing rapid increase in access. Conversely, a decline in 
access to electricity, water or other goods is likely to engender disappointment and frustration, even 
if local levels of access remain relatively high, compared with other areas. Hence, one potential 
source of grievance is the relative decline of public goods provision. Our measure of grievances 
related to the distribution of public expenditure is the increase (positive or negative) in the share of 
households with access to piped water into their dwelling between 1997 and 2005. Piped water is an 
essential good, the provision of which depends crucially on the public provision of infrastructure. 
Also, measures of access to water services are more readily comparable between the household 
surveys available than measures of access to, say, electricity, schooling, roads or clinics. 
 
3.3  Greed 
Ethnic polarization may explode into violence because of grievances over land or public resources, 
especially when the allocation of land and public goods is perceived to take place according to 
unfair, ethnic criteria. However, ethnic tensions may also be a tool in the hands of opportunistic, 
political entrepreneurs. Polarization may only have turned violent because local political leaders, or 
leaders of criminal gangs, saw the post-election period as an opportunity to reach certain targets by 
means of violence. The Waki Commission collected evidence suggesting that politicians, including 
members of parliament as well as ministers, played a part in organizing and arming militias. There is 
even evidence that some perpetrators of violence were paid a piece rate fee for each hut they 
burned down (Waki 2008, p. 87). Also, it is well established that the Mungiki criminal network played 
a very active part in organizing violence in Nakuru, Naivasha town and elsewhere. Other criminal 10 
 
gangs also played a role, at least in the slums of Nairobi. Of course, politicians and even gangsters 
may simply have responded to demand from local populations, and this demand may be rooted in 
the grievances discussed above. Alternatively, however, political and criminal leaders may have had 
more self-centered motives. A politician may wish to engage in ethnic cleansing in order to drive out 
groups traditionally backing political opponents. He or she may also wish to drive certain groups off 
the land, in order to make way for occupation by supporters. Land may be used as a patronage good. 
Criminal leaders may have taken the opportunity to increase their areas of control, for example 
within slums. They may also have been able to exploit episodes of violence to recruit new members.  
An important factor determining the political- or criminal leader’s desire to organize a campaign of 
violence is the availability and cost of “labor” resources to be deployed in the campaign. Based on 
this line of reasoning, we use a measure of unemployment among young males (the most likely 
militia members) as a proxy for “greed”. Second, since the bulk of potential, greedy entrepreneurs 
who may have organized violence are politicians, we use a measure of political competition, 
measured as the absolute difference in votes for Kibaki and for Odinga in the presidential election, 
relative to the total number of votes for both candidates in the district. The idea is that the incentive 
for electorally motivated ethnic cleansing is higher in areas where elections are close.  
In addition to the above mentioned factors, which we have tentatively grouped as “greed”- and 
“grievance”  factors, we also include a measure of poverty.  Studies of the determinants of civil 
conflict typically find that per capita income is correlated with conflict. Poverty may be a source of 
grievances. On the other hand, poverty also improves the recruitment possibilities for political 
entrepreneurs, and may reduce the local state’s ability to respond to violence, because poverty is 
typically associated with a low potential for taxation.  
 
4.  Data 
4.1  Fatalities related to post-election violence 
The intensity of ethno-political violence is measured in this paper by the per capita number of 
fatalities related to the post election violence in each district. We exploit the data collected by the 
Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV), better known as the Waki Commission, 
named after its chairman, Justice Philip N. Waki. The Waki Commission was established as part of 
the international-brokered agreement that ended the stand-off between government and 
opposition in March 2008. It was charged with investigating the extent and causes of the post-
election violence.  The commission collected evidence on post-election violence from hospitals, 11 
 
doctors, the Ministry of Medical services and the police. It traveled around the country and 
interviewed hundreds of witness. The commission concludes that 1,133 deaths resulted from the 
post-election violence. Confidence in this estimate is strengthened by two facts. First, the 
Commission is perceived to have worked independently of government interference. Although its 
chairman is Kenyan, the two other members were foreigners (a New Zealander and a Congolese). 
The work and report of the commission was followed intensely by local media as well international 
observers. Some of the recommendations made by the Commission were highly inconvenient for 
some members of government. In particular, the Commission advocated that a tribunal was 
established in order to prosecute those bearing main responsibility for the violence. It included with 
its final report a sealed list of a number of individuals against whom it had collected evidence of such 
activities. If the tribunal was not established by a set date, this list would be forwarded to the 
International Criminal Court in the Hague. In fact, the tribunal was never established and the list has 
indeed been sent to the ICC, which is preparing cases against, among others, William Ruto, a Kalenjin 
leader and former Minister, and Uhuru Kenyatta. Second, an independent inquiry based on detailed 
tracking of media reports finds a number of fatalities of roughly the same magnitude, namely 1,128 
(Dercon and Gutierrez-Romero 2010). 
Since districts vary considerably in terms of population size, the number of fatalities related to 
post election violence is normalized by district population. Population data is taken from the 2008 
Statistical Abstract of Kenya (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 2008). Estimated numbers for the 
year 2007 are used. 
 
4.2  Ethnicity data 
Due to the highly sensitive nature of issues related to ethnicity in Kenya, data on ethnic composition 
are generally not published. The most recently available, pre-2008 data on ethnic composition at the 
district level is from 1989 Census. This is the data used here. As a result of migration and differential 
population growth rates, ethnic composition is likely to have undergone some change between 1989 
and 2007. However, since ethnic mix is generally quite stable over time, it is reasonable to view the 
1989 data as a good approximation of the status in 2007. An additional source of error is generated 12 
 
by the fact that some districts were split up between 1989 and 2007. It is assumed that new districts 




4.3  Data from household surveys 
Several important district characteristics are measured with use of data from the 2005 Kenya 
Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS). This survey was conducted by the National Bureau of 
Statistics in collaboration with the World Bank  and other external donors.  A total of 13,158 
households (housing 66,725 individuals) were interviewed. This gives an average of 191 households 
(967 individuals) per district. This data is used to compute district-level estimates of a number of 
variables. 
First, the KIHBS data provides estimates of poverty. The consumption measure and poverty 
lines calculated by the World Bank and reported in the 2008 Kenya Poverty and Inequality 
Assessment Report (World Bank 2008) are used. Poverty lines were defined according to standard 
criteria, based on nutritional- and a limited set of non-food requirements. 
Secondly, the KIHBS data is exploited to generate measures of unemployment among young 
males as well as among the general workforce. The workforce is defined as all individual between 15 
and 64 who are not recorded in the survey as retired, home makers, full time students, incapacitated 
or too sick to work. Among these the unemployed are defined as those “seeking work”, as well as 
those reported to be “doing nothing”. This is somewhat broader than the definition of 
unemployment typically used in developed countries, since in this context typically only those who 
seek work, but cannot find it, are defined as unemployed. In a context of widespread poverty and 
absence of unemployment benefits it is unlikely that healthy, working age individuals voluntarily 
remain without a source of income. When individuals are reported to be “doing nothing” rather than 
“seeking work” it is more likely to result from very low prospects of actually finding a job than from a 
lack of desire to work. Male youth unemployment is defined as unemployment among males in the 
workforce aged 15 to 30. 
Thirdly, the survey data is used to create a measure of land inequality. In particular, the Gini 
coefficient of agricultural land holdings among rural households in each district is calculated. A 
                                                           
4 The 2009 Census also collected data on ethnicity. However, since an important motivation behind the 2007/8 
post-election violence was ethnic cleansing, measures of ethnic mix based on 2009 data is clearly endogenous 
in a model explaining the post-election violence. 13 
 
weakness of this measure is the failure to take the quality of agricultural land into account. Land 
fertility varies widely across Kenya. However, most of this variation is arguably between- rather than 
within districts, which reduces the importance of this source of error. 
Finally, a variable measuring the share of the population with access to piped water in their 
dwelling (“private” piped water) is calculated from both the 2005 KIHBS and from a previous survey, 
the 1997 Welfare Measurement Survey, which is also a national coverage survey, collected by the 
National Bureau of Statistics. Based on these two data sets, the percentage change in access to 
private, piped water between 1997 and 2005 is calculated.  
 
4.4  Election data 
Data on the results of the 2007 elections were downloaded from the web site of the Electoral 
Commission of Kenya, ECK (the ECK has since been dissolved and its website shut down. The data is 
available on request from the authors). We aggregate data from the electoral constituency level to 
the district level and create a measure of political competition by calculating the absolute difference 
between vote shares for President Mwai Kibaki and opposition leader Raila Odinga. Clearly, these 
data are not entirely reliable. Indeed, as described above, a main trigger of the violence was the 
perception that they are not. The Kriegler Commission, which investigated the process of the 2007 
elections, concluded that irregularities were observed in several constituencies. Most cheating 
seems to have taken place in the “heartlands” of each of the main contenders, Kibaki and Odinga. 
Hence, the elections probably tend to underestimate the true extent of  political competition, 
especially in areas where one of the candidates dominated. Neither the Kriegler Commission nor 
other bodies have attempted to produce a “corrected” list of election results. 
 
5.  Descriptive statistics and estimation strategy 
Figure 2 shows that the violence was concentrated in the South Western part of Kenya, and in 
Nairobi and Mombasa. When trying to understand the causes of post-election violence, it is 
interesting to compare districts experiencing violence with those that did not. However, we believe 
that the most relevant type of comparison is between the violence-struck districts and other districts 
in the same part of the country. Indeed, the areas in the far North and East of Kenya differ from the 
areas in the South-West along a large number of dimensions, including ecology, ethnicity, religion 14 
 
and livelihood strategies. Also, the presence of the state in several of these districts is very limited. 
Therefore, although violence frequently occurs in these areas, for example in the form of cattle raids 
(Mkutu 2006),  the incentives for fighting over election results are quite limited.  Therefore, our 
preferred estimation sample includes only  the districts were killings occurred, and the districts 
bordering these. Furthermore, since some of the hypotheses tested in the analysis relate to the 
effects of land pressure and land inequality, it is natural to focus on mostly rural districts. Therefore, 
the predominantly urban districts of Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu are excluded in most analyses. 
In robustness tests, all districts with available data are included. 
The determinants of post election violence are investigated in this paper with the use of 
regression analysis. One standard assumption behind regression analysis is the independence of 
individual observations. This assumption does not strictly hold in the present context. Spill-over 
effects between districts played a role. We nevertheless continue. First, the assumption of 
independent observations almost never holds completely in macro- or meso-level datasets. For 
example, the cross-country data sets used to investigate the causes of civil war are in many cases 
characterized by spill-over effects from conflict in one country to conflict in another.  
Second, the fatalities in the post election data set are for all we know not dependent in the 
strong sense of having been centrally planned and coordinated. There has been much debate about 
whether the violence was “spontaneous” or “planned”. A great deal of evidence, for example in the 
Waki report, indicates that politicians and elders did in many cases play a very active role in 
organizing militias. However, no evidence indicates that leaders organized violence outside their 
“own” areas. Hence, violence was generally organized by different groups in different districts. Also, 
violence erupted in most districts very quickly after the announcement of presidential election 
results on December 30
th. Only a few killings had taken place before this date. Hence, violence did 
not in general spread gradually from one district to another. It erupted almost simultaneously in 
several different locations. While the districts affected by post-election violence are contiguous, with 
the exception of Mombasa, see Figure 2, the intensity of conflict varied widely within this area. This 
variation is not readily explained by geographical proximity. The three districts with the highest 
number of killings (Nairobi, Nakuru, Uasin Gishu) do not border each other. Third, the main potential 
effect of spill over between districts is autocorrelation in the regression residuals. In linear 
regressions, autocorrelation affects statistical inference, but not point estimates. Our preferred 
strategy for dealing with spill over effects is to introduce province fixed effects (province dummies). 
Most spill over seems to have occurred within provinces (for example, the killings in Nakuru and 
Naivasha towns were to an important extent reactions to killings elsewhere in the Rift Valley). Fixed 15 
 
effects capture the province-wide rise in violence, which occurred as a result of spill over. 
Furthermore, in one robustness test we also allow errors to be correlated across districts 
neighboring  each other, using the so-called “spatial error model”. A “spatial lag model” is also 
estimated. In this model, violence in district i is assumed to depend on average levels of violence in 
neighboring districts (Anselin 1988). 
One factor which exacerbated the negative consequences of the violence, but facilitates 
statistical analysis, is the fact that the intensity and extent of the post-election violence caught most 
Kenyans completely by surprise. As described above, there is a history of ethno-political violence in 
Kenya, especially in the Rift Valley. However, on previous occasions most violence had occurred 
before rather than after elections. Also, the intensity of violence experienced in 2007/8 was 
unprecedented. If, on the other hand, the violence had been widely anticipated, then this would give 
rise to endogeneity problems in the statistical analysis. For example, anticipated conflict may lead to 
lower investment and therefore to higher poverty and unemployment. In this sense, there might be 
a reverse, causal link from conflict to poverty and unemployment. Since the conflict was 
unanticipated by most people, these problems are in fact likely to be of minor importance. 
 
5.1  Ethnic polarization 
As mentioned above, many quantitative studies of ethnicity and violent conflict have used the 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization index (ELF) as the key measure of ethnic diversity (e.g. Colier and 
Hoeffler 1998, Fearon and Laitin 2003). Reynal-Querol (2002) devised the “RQ” index to capture 
polarization, as opposed to fractionalization.
5
                                                           
5 The ELF index is defined as 
 Measures such as these are highly useful for studying, 
for example, the overall picture of civil conflicts across countries or across long stretches of time. 
However, when the purpose is to study a specific episode of conflict, such as the 2007/8 post 
election violence in  Kenya, then these measures ignore  important information by treating all 
divisions between groups as equally important. In fact, in most specific conflicts, some fault lines are 
much more salient than others. In the present case, the context led to a strong emphasis on the 
distinction between the Kikuyu group on the one hand, and most other ethnic groups on the other. 
2 1 i
i
s −∑ , where si is the share of ethnic group i the total population. The RQ 
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 ∑ . The RQ index was the measure of polarization used in Montalvo 
and Reynal-Querol 2005. 16 
 
As described above, the Kikuyu are the most numerous ethnic group in Kenya and by most measures 
also the most economically successful. Kikuyus have migrated out of their “ancestral” area to a 
higher extent than most other groups and have mostly been economically successful where they 
have settled. Two of the three Presidents in independent Kenya have been Kikuyus. Finally, the 2007 
Presidential election was perceived by many to have been stolen by the incumbent, Kikuyu 
president, Mwai Kibaki. On this background, most of the post election violence was a result of 
fighting between Kikuyus and other groups. In many places, Kikuyus were attacked by members of 
other groups, mostly from Western Kenya. In other cases, for example in Nakuru, Naivasha and 
Kiambu, Kikuyus mounted attacks on members of these groups. To be sure, this is not the full 
picture. Non-Kikuyu settlers in the Rift Valley, for example from the Kisii and Luhya communities, 
were in a number of cases victims of attacks by Kalenjin militias. On the Coast, Kambas and other 
upland communities were targeted along with Kikuyus. Still, the tension between Kikuyus and non-
Kikuyus was much more important than other antagonistic relations. For this reason, the measure of 
ethnic polarization applied in this study is an indicator taking the value one if the share of Kikuyus in 
the district population is larger than five and lower than 95 percent, and zero otherwise. Hence, the 
variable indicates that the district has a Kikuyu population of non-trivial size, coexisting with a non-
Kikuyu population of non-trivial size. Conceptually, the measure is more closely related to Reynal-
Querol’s polarization index than to the ELF, although in practice the correlation with the ELF index is 
.50, while the correlation with the RQ index is only .46.  
Figure 3 shows that the intensity of violence was indeed magnitudes higher in areas with Kikuyu 
population shares between 5 and 95 percent than in areas with very few Kikuyus and in the Kikuyu 
heartland districts in Central Province, where Kikuyus comprise more than 95 percent of the 
population. 
Now, the key observation made in this paper is that although violence was on average much 
more intense in areas with Kikuyu-non-Kikuyu polarization, there were a number of areas where 
Kikuyus co-existed with other groups and fatalities did not occur. The Kikuyu share is between 5 and 
95 in a total of 17 districts in Kenya. In nine of these districts, no fatalities were reported as a result 
of post-election violence. Five of these nine districts border districts where killings did occur 
(Baringo, Laikipia, Kajiado, Trans Mara and Thika).  In all of these, Kikuyus lived side by side with 
sizeable groups of Kalenjin, Luo or Luhya, all communities which heavily favored the ODM in the 
elections and with which much fighting occurred in other districts. Among the districts where killings 
did take place, there is huge variation in the intensity of violence, even among districts with Kikuyu 
shares between 5 and 95. Therefore, as discussed in the introduction, the key question we ask is: 17 
 
why did polarization between Kikuyus and non-Kikuyus explode into violence in some districts and 
not, or to a much smaller extent, in others? 
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the variables used in regression analyses below. Table A1 
in the appendix presents the entire data set used. The tables reveal very significant variation on all 
the variables used. A main concern is the influence of outliers, particularly on the  dependent 
variables. Killings per capita were significantly higher in the districts of Uasin Gishu and, to a smaller 
extent, Nakuru than in other districts. We address the issue of influential observations in the 
discussion of regression results below. 
Table 2 presents the matrix of bivariate correlations between the main variables used. The 
variable Kikuyu595 takes the value one if the share of Kikuyus in the population is more than five- 
and less than 95 percent. The first column shows that the per capita number of killings during the 
post-election violence was significantly correlated with Kikuyu-non-Kikuyu polarization, male youth 
unemployment  and  land inequality. Correlations with the remaining variables  are far from 
significant. In particular, the correlation between poverty and intensity of violence is insignificant, 
and the point estimate is negative. This contrasts with findings from cross-country studies of civil 
wars, which typically find a strong correlation between income per capita and the intensity of 
conflict (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004, Fearon and Laitin 2003, Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti 
2004). Do and Iyer’s study of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal also finds that poorer districts were 
more exposed to violent conflict than others (Do and Iyer 2010). The reason behind the result is 
partly to be found in the significant, negative correlation between poverty and Kikuyu-non-Kikuyu 
polarization (r=-.356, p=.01). Kikuyus have tended to migrate into areas with good  economic 
opportunities and therefore polarization is systematically higher in more affluent areas. The results 
presented below reveal that among districts with Kikuyu-non-Kikuyu polarization, poorer districts 
did indeed experience more violence. 
 
6.  Regression results 
Table 3 presents multiple regressions explaining the number of killings committed per 100,000 
population. Explanatory variables include the measures included in Table 2. Since the main purpose 
of the analyses is to investigate why ethnic polarization had a stronger effect on violence in some 
districts than in others, a key element in the empirical strategy is to introduce interactions between 
polarization and the potential drivers of ethnic violence. Interactions between Kikuyu595 and the 18 
 
other explanatory variables are therefore included. In addition, province dummies are introduced. 
The simultaneous inclusion of several interactions between Kikuyu595 and other variables gives rise 
to concerns about multicollinearity. Therefore, the maximum Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is 
presented for each regression.
6
In the first regression, the maximum VIF is 8.4, not far below the rule-of-thumb threshold of 10. 
At the same time, many variables are insignificant. In subsequent regressions, therefore, 
insignificant variables are gradually removed from the model. The explanatory power of the model 
remains high in all regressions, with an R-squared of .86 in the last regression (adjusted R-squared = 
.81). The VIF gradually drops and reaches the value of 3.9 in the last regression.  
 As a rule of thumb, VIFs above 10 are often taken as indications of 
excessive multicollinearity (Neter et. al. 1989). 
In all regressions in the table, three of the interactions with Kikuyu595 are significant at the 1 
percent level, namely those with poverty, male youth unemployment and change in access to 
private, piped water. None of the other three interaction terms (with population density, land 
inequality and political competition) are significant. The main effect of Kikuyu595 is significant in 
three models, while none of the other main effects are significant. These results indicate that ethnic 
violence is triggered by poverty, unemployment among young men, and decline in access to 
essential services provided by the state. On the other hand, the hypotheses that land inequality, 
population pressure and political competition were important conditioning factors behind the post-
election violence are not supported. 
Table 4 tests the robustness of the estimated effects of poverty, youth unemployment and 
change in access to piped water. All regressions  in this table are essentially permutations of 
regression 4 in Table 3. First, as indicated above, the dependent variable, killings per capita, is quite 
skewed. Therefore, the potential effect of outliers on estimated coefficients is an important concern. 
Table A1 reveals that the intensity of violence in the district of Uasin Gishu (27 killings pr 100,000 
inhabitants) was almost twice as high as in the district with the second-highest intensity of violence 
(Nakuru, with 16 killings per 100,000 inhabitants). To check whether results are driven by Uasin 
Gishu, this district is removed in the first regression in Table 4. In the second regression, Nakuru 
district, where the highest total number of killings occurred, is also removed. In the third regression, 
the urban districts of Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu are included in the estimation sample. This is 
                                                           
6 The VIF for variable  i x is defined as 
2 1/ (1 ) i R − , where 
2
i R is the R-squared from a regression of  i x on the 
other explanatory variables. 19 
 
arguably meaningful, since the variables intended to measure grievances related to agricultural land, 
population density and land inequality, are not included in this model. To check whether results are 
an artifact of the choice to reduce the estimation sample to only districts with post-election violence 
and the districts neighboring these, the fourth regression includes all district in Kenya with available 
data. 
Since the dependent variable, killings per capita, is truncated at zero, a tobit model may be 
viewed as more appropriate than Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Because OLS is more robust than 
tobit to alternative assumptions about the distribution of regression errors, our preferred estimator 
is OLS. However, regression 5 in table 4 presents results from applying a tobit estimator.  
As mentioned above, it seems likely that violence in some cases spilled over from one district to 
neighboring areas. Regressions 6 and 7 take account of this possibility by presenting results from, 
respectively, a spatial error- and a spatial lag model (Anselin 1988). In the spatial error model, errors 
are allowed to be correlated across districts neighboring each other. In the spatial lag model, the 
level of violence in district i is assumed to depend on the average level of violence in neighboring 
districts.
7
The Waki report distinguishes between killings by gunshot and other killings, and assumes that 
killings were done by the police if an only if they happened by  gunshot. The killings committed by 
the police were arguably not directly motivated by a strategy of ethnic cleansing. Rather, much 
police violence resulted from the brutal and clumsy attempt of the police force to control the 
reactions of frustrated opposition supporters to the announcement of election results. In contrast, 
most of the killings by non-police perpetrators in rural areas and in the slums of Nairobi were the 
results of deliberate attempts at ethnic cleansing. From this perspective, the killings committed by 
civilians were ethnically motivated in a stronger sense than the killings committed by the police. As 
we are searching for the determinants of ethnic violence, it might therefore make sense to focus 
only on killings committed by civilians. This is done in regression 7, where the dependent variable is 
the per capital number of killings committed by civilians (i.e. by non-police perpetrators). 
  These models are estimated by maximum likelihood.  
                                                           
7 In the weights matrix applied in these analyses, all districts neighboring district i have the weight 1/ni, where 
ni is the number of districts neighboring district i. All other weights are zero. Hence, as is conventional, the 
weights for each observation sum to 1. 
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Finally, regressions 2 and 3 dealt with the potential problems of high outliers by excluding 
extreme observations. An alternative method for reducing the influence of outliers is to use a binary 
indicator of violence as the dependent variable. This strategy is implemented in regression 8, where 
the regressand is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a district experienced at least 10 killings as a 
result of post-election violence and zero otherwise. 
In all these regressions, the three interactions between Kikuyu595 and, respectively, poverty, 
male youth unemployment and change in access to private, piped water remain statistically 
significant, in most cases at the one percent level. Therefore, the estimated effects of these variables 
appear not  to  be artifacts  of sample selection, influential  outliers, spatial effects or choice of 
estimator. The explanatory power of the models is in most cases somewhat lower than in Table 3, 
but remains quite high (R-sq = .59 or above).  
 
6.1  Areas with Kikuyu-non-Kikuyu polarization 
In the analyses presented above, hypotheses about triggers of ethnic violence were tested by 
means of interactions terms between the measure of ethnic polarization (Kikuyu595) and other 
variables. An alternative and perhaps more simple method is to restrict the sample to districts with 
Kikuyu-non-Kikuyu polarization and ask what accounts for variation in levels of violence among these 
districts. This is the approach taken in Table 5, which is based only on districts with Kikuyu shares 
between five and 95. The first regression in this table includes the same six, explanatory variables as 
the ones interacted with Kikuyu595 in the first regression in Table 3, namely poverty, male youth 
unemployment, change in access to piped water, rural  population density, land inequality and 
political competition. Tables 3 and 4 include province dummies. In the sample with only Kikuyu-non-
Kikuyu polarized districts, however, only Rift Valley province contributes with more than two 
districts. For this reason, and to save on scarce degrees of freedom, only an indicator for being in the 
Rift Valley is included. Again, only districts with post-election violence and the districts bordering 
these are included. In most analyses, Nairobi and Mombasa are excluded (Kisumu is not included in 
the sample because it has less than five percent Kikuyus). 
As in Table 3, insignificant variables are gradually removed in regressions 2, 3 and 4. The result 
is that, as in Tables 3 and 4, poverty, male youth unemployment and change in access to private, 
piped water emerge as the most important determinants of violence. The robustness of this finding 
is tested in regressions 5 to 7. In regression 5, Uasin Gishu district is removed. In regression 6, 21 
 
Nakuru district as well as Uasin Gishu are excluded. In regression 7, Nairobi and Mombasa are 
included. The removal of the high-violence districts of Nakuru and Uasin Gishu does not affect the 
qualitative findings, although t-statics and explanatory power are somewhat reduced. The inclusion 
of Nairobi and Mombasa leads to a drop in the coefficient on poverty, which is now insignificant. 
Nairobi and Mombasa had higher than expected levels of violence, given their relatively low levels of 
poverty. A closer look at the variation in violence within these cities, however, does provide support 
for the view that poverty drives violence. In both Nairobi and Mombasa, violence was much more 
intense in poor slum  areas than in more prosperous neighborhoods (Waki 2008, chap. 5).  The 
explanatory  power of the model  is high, with adjusted R-squared values ranging from .67 in 
regression 7 to .90 in regression 3. 
The last regression explores the effects of unemployment in more detail. We have assumed that 
unemployment among young men is a particularly potent driver of violence because unemployed 
young males are an excellent recruitment base for “greedy” entrepreneurs of violence. However, 
unemployment is also a potential source of frustration, or “grievances”. If violence is driven by the 
grievances of the general population, overall unemployment should be equally important as 
unemployment specifically among young men. On the other hand, if violence is driven by the ease of 
organizing a violent campaign, unemployment among young men would be particularly important. 
Regression 8 includes overall unemployment and male youth unemployment simultaneously. The 
two variables are highly correlated (r = .89) and so their effects are difficult to distinguish. 
Nevertheless, the results are interesting. The effect of overall unemployment is completely 
insignificant and the point estimate is negative. Male youth unemployment, on the other hand, 
retains a high, positive coefficient, which is almost significant (t = 1.77, p=.135). Given the small 
sample size and the high correlation between the two unemployment variables, the fact that male 
youth unemployment (and also poverty) fall just short of being significant in regression 8 is not 
surprising.  What deserves attention is the fact that male youth unemployment completely 
dominates overall unemployment. This supports the view that unemployment among young men is 
a particularly potent source of violence. It also gives some support to the view that the ethnic 






7.  Conclusion 
As is the case with many conflicts in Africa and elsewhere, the 2007/8 post-election violence 
was widely perceived as the result of long-standing ethnic antagonisms (e.g. New York Times 2007). 
The results presented here show that this view is highly simplistic. The outbreak of post-election 
violence was triggered by  the combined effect of ethnic polarization, a flawed election process and 
economic forces such as poverty, male youth unemployment and lack of access to public services. 
Following the influential conceptual framework outlined by Collier and Hoeffler, these 
economic  factors were tentatively viewed as proxies for “grievances” (access to piped water), 
“greed” (male  youth unemployment),  or both (poverty). Therefore, the results indicate that 
grievances of the general public and the  greed of powerful individuals both contributed  to 
generating violent conflict in Kenya. 
In contrast with some qualitative accounts of the post-election violence, we find little evidence 
that land inequality, land pressure or political competition were decisive factors behind the outbreak 
of conflict. Future research should investigate whether the insignificant effects of land inequality is 
driven by the failure to measure “horizontal inequalities”, that is, inequalities in land ownership 
between different ethnic groups (Stewart 2002). 
The findings have interesting policy implications. The fact that the drivers of ethnic conflict 
appear to be economic in nature suggest that perhaps the most effective means to avoiding ethnic 
conflict is not to address the issue of ethnicity directly, for example through nation-building policies 
or decentralization to local governments of ethnically homogeneous areas (the latter option has 
been hotly debated on Kenya under the heading of “majimbo”, or federalism). A focus on standard 
aspects of economic development, such as poverty, unemployment and public services, might be 
more effective.  
Africa’s disappointing growth performance is sometimes explained as a result of ethnic 
fragmentation (Easterly and Levine 1997). This explanation may well be descriptively valid, but the 
results presented indicate that it is not valid as an excuse for the leaders of a country with poor 
economic performance:  A  benevolent government does not face a trade-off between pursuing 
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Table 1  Descriptive statistics 
       Mean  Std. Dev. 
PEV killings  24.1  54.7 
PEV killings committed by civilians  15.5  46.2 
Population ('000)  614  462 
Kikuyu (percent)  18.0  32.2 
Poor (percent)  46.6  13.8 
Male youth unemployment (percent)  16.0  12.1 
Rural population density (rural pop./sq.km)  314  242 
Political competition*  0.63  0.32 
Gini, land ownership  0.55  0.09 
Share with access to private, piped water, 
   
14.5  15.7 
Change in share with access to private, piped 
     
3.1  12.8 
N = 47. * Political competition is defined as |votes for Kibaki – votes                                                         
for Odinga|/( votes for Kibaki + votes for Odinga). 
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Table 2  Correlation matrix 
















competition  Gini, land 
Killings committed by civilians 
per 100,000 inhabitants 
0.917                      
(0.000) 
              Kikuyu595  0.383  0.444 
           
 
(0.008)  (0.002) 
            Poverty rate  -0.078  -0.088  -0.356 
         
 
(0.604)  (0.558)  (0.014) 
          Male youth unemployment  0.265  0.277  0.248  -0.089 
       
 
(0.072)  (0.060)  (0.093)  (0.552) 
        Rural population density  0.025  -0.171  -0.347  -0.080  0.095 
     
 
(0.870)  (0.261)  (0.020)  (0.604)  (0.533) 
      Political competition  -0.122  -0.145  -0.275  -0.187  -0.318  -0.301 
   
 
(0.414)  (0.332)  (0.061)  (0.207)  (0.030)  (0.040) 
    Gini, land  0.298  0.244  0.383  -0.335  0.195  -0.083  -0.075 
 
 
(0.047)  (0.106)  (0.009)  (0.025)  (0.200)  (0.589)  (0.624) 
  Change in share with private, 
piped water 
0.034  0.009  0.103  -0.239  -0.132  -0.007  0.195  0.234 
(0.818)  (0.951)  (0.493)  (0.106)  (0.378)  (0.963)  (0.190)  (0.122) 
N = 47, except for pairs including the land ownership gini rural population density, where Nairobi and Mombasa districts are excluded. 
Only districts with PEV killings, and the districts bordering these districts, are included. p-values in parentheses. 
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Table 3  Determinants of post-election violence 
           Dependent variable: Killings per 100,000 inhabitants 
Kikuyu595  3.375  4.120*  4.165***  4.244*** 
 
(1.48)  (2.01)  (3.12)  (3.29) 
Kikuyu595*poverty rate  33.176***  29.947***  32.050***  31.187*** 
 
(3.73)  (3.85)  (4.65)  (4.68) 
Kikuyu595*male youth unemployment  67.986***  67.150***  67.788***  68.776*** 
 
(6.65)  (6.96)  (7.74)  (7.85) 
Kikuyu595*change in share with private piped water  -50.015***  -51.072***  -51.254***  -50.713*** 
 
(5.43)  (5.76)  (6.68)  (6.58) 
Kikuyu595*political competition  -2.751  -5.432  -4.107 
 
 
(0.52)  (1.33)  (1.12) 
  Kikuyu595*rural population density  -0.003  -0.002 
   
 
(0.45)  (0.26) 
    Kikuyu595*land gini  12.597 
     
 
(0.77) 
      Poverty rate  -4.116  -4.274  -6.494  -7.922 
 
(0.66)  (0.70)  (1.23)  (1.68) 
Male youth unemployment  4.668  4.617  4.548  4.573 
 
(0.91)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.01) 
Change in share with access to private, piped water  4.977  4.802  4.54  2.434 
 
(1.00)  (1.01)  (1.01)  (0.57) 
Political competition  0.522  0.507  -0.672 
 
 
(0.23)  (0.24)  (0.39) 
  Rural population density  0.002  0.002 
   
 
(0.91)  (0.97) 
    Gini of agricultural land  -0.148 
     
 
(0.02) 
      Province dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
          Observations  44  44  44  44 
R-squared  0.88  0.87  0.87  0.86 
Maximum VIF  8.4  7.9  5.7  3.9 
OLS regressions. Absolute value of t statistics in brackets. Only districts with PEV killings, and the districts bordering 
these districts, are included. Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu are excluded. The variables interacted with Kikuyu595 
are entered as deviations from means. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4  Robustness tests 
       
     
       Dependent variable: 







10 killings = 
1 
 




OLS  OLS 
Kikuyu595  4.077***  3.411**  2.488  2.722*  3.306  4.221***  4.052***  3.193**  0.242 
 
(3.07)  (2.74)  (1.28)  (1.93)  (1.63)  (4.11)  (3.76)  (2.72)  (1.17) 
Kikuyu595*poverty rate  29.865***  25.949***  23.398**  17.301**  30.761***  30.669***  30.854***  21.624***  2.243** 
 
(4.24)  (3.91)  (2.32)  (2.06)  (2.78)  (6.12)  (5.60)  (3.56)  (2.11) 
Kikuyu595*male youth unempl.  63.707***  49.370***  44.664***  35.709***  79.349***  69.620***  68.307***  60.631***  2.497* 
 
(5.37)  (4.04)  (3.84)  (3.70)  (5.62)  (9.71)  (9.44)  (7.60)  (1.79) 
Kikuyu595*change in share with 
private piped water 
-47.721*** -44.431*** -44.152*** -28.151*** -65.037***  -46.079***  -51.654***  -33.685***  -3.530*** 
(5.26)  (5.28)  (3.73)  (3.17)  (5.37)  (7.11)  (8.06)  (4.80)  (2.87) 
Poverty rate  -7.632  -6.343  -1.172  -4.257  -8.267  -10.289***  -7.543*  -6.028  -1.716** 
 
(1.59)  (1.43)  (0.17)  (0.93)  (1.13)  (2.73)  (1.93)  (1.40)  (2.27) 
Male youth unemployment  4.592  4.678  12.065*  7.445  9.052  4.13  5.67  0.554  0.054 
 
(1.00)  (1.11)  (1.79)  (1.43)  (1.40)  (1.23)  (1.46)  (0.13)  (0.07) 
Change in share with private, 
piped water 
2.706  3.911  4.604  1.223  3.733  2.704  3.32  -2.079  0.418 
(0.62)  (0.98)  (0.69)  (0.33)  (0.64)  (0.79)  (0.92)  (0.53)  (0.61) 
Lambda  
         
-0.585** 
     
           
(2.19) 
      Gamma 
           
0.149 
   
             
(1.15) 
    Province dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 



























Observations  43  42  47  64  44  44  44  44  44 
R-squared  0.73  0.67  0.67  0.59           0.82  0.50 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets. Only districts with PEV killings, and the districts bordering these districts, are included, except in regression 
4, where all districts with available data are included. Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu are also excluded, except in regression 3 and 4. The variables 
interacted with Kikuyu595 are entered as deviations from means.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5  Determinants of post-election violence - only districts with kikuyu-non-kikuyu polarization 
   Dependent variable: Killings per 100,000 inhabitants 
Poverty rate  17.088  15.019  17.785*  20.103**  19.785*  18.171*  11.151  18.383 
 
(1.31)  (1.58)  (2.53)  (2.64)  (2.32)  (2.35)  (0.88)  (1.26) 
Male youth unemployment  66.501**  65.857***  66.094***  74.466***  72.510***  59.311**  56.977***  80.799 
 
(4.96)  (5.68)  (6.20)  (7.32)  (4.44)  (3.46)  (3.61)  (1.77) 
Overall unemployment 
             
-14.257 
               
(0.14) 
Change in share with access 
to private, piped water 
-41.173** -41.646**  -41.598*** -48.414***  -47.165**  -42.792**  -33.353**  -46.115* 
(3.64)  (4.24)  (4.60)  (5.55)  (3.86)  (3.76)  (2.41)  (2.46) 
Rural population per sq. km.  0.016  0.017  0.015 
         
 
(1.16)  (1.49)  (1.54) 
          Political competition  4.169  3.065 
           
 
(0.51)  (0.49) 
            Gini of agricultural land  6.314 
             
 
(0.28) 
              Rift Valley  16.92  17.411*  14.631**  8.221**  8.075*  6.565*  9.931**  8.873 
 
(1.87)  (2.23)  (3.00)  (2.91)  (2.51)  (2.15)  (2.41)  (1.61) 
Constant  -33.719  -28.904**  -25.705*** -19.626***  -19.161**  -15.933**  -15.081**  -19.215** 
 
(1.71)  (3.29)  (4.78)  (4.85)  (3.64)  (3.07)  (2.31)  (3.64) 
Sample modification 
     












                  Observations  11  11  11  11  10  9  13  11 
Adjusted R-squared  0.85  0.88  0.90  0.88  0.72  0.67  0.57  0.85 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets. Only districts with PEV killings, and the districts bordering these 
districts, are included. Nairobi and Mombasa are excluded, except in regression 7. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Figure 3  Kikuyu population shares and post-election violence 
All killings
Killings committed by civiliansTable A1  Data 





























Nakuru  263  234  1,602.2  59.7  41.8  28.2  156  31.6  0.64  10.6 
Uasin Gishu  230  202  836.8  16.9  44.6  35.3  179  56.1  0.63  -6.8 
Nairobi  125  102  3,034.4  32.4  22.2  27.0  .  4.1  .  17.1 
Trans Nzoia  104  27  771.0  9.6  50.0  16.2  290  8.7  0.75  -7.9 
Kisumu  81  17  620.6  0.8  43.8  14.7  204  96.2  0.47  1.5 
Kericho  65  28  630.0  3.6  42.3  10.2  271  77.3  0.66  39.1 
Kakamega  31  5  792.4  0.8  53.6  39.8  519  41.3  0.55  -8.9 
Bungoma  28  14  1,149.0  1.1  50.9  8.5  501  32.4  0.46  -8.8 
Mombasa  27  23  871.7  6.3  37.5  38.8  .  41.8  .  -3.2 
Migori  26  2  636.9  0.1  41.7  20.0  286  96.5  0.55  0.5 
Bureti  24  12  423.1  3.6  33.0  2.1  436  91.3  0.74  39.1 
Koibatek  23  16  188.1  7.2  56.9  20.1  66  63.3  0.49  8.2 
Narok  19  18  488.9  11.3  26.3  3.8  32  47.7  0.69  -18.1 
Vihiga  18  3  655.9  0.8  41.6  17.6  1,102  60.8  0.66  1.4 
Butere Mumias  12  1  625.1  0.8  52.0  26.3  605  68.9  0.72  -8.9 
Siaya  10  1  593.4  0.1  40.2  6.2  375  99.2  0.40  4.7 
Bomet  9  7  517.1  3.6  58.2  3.3  272  92.8  0.48  -16.0 
Kisii  9  5  609.7  0.1  52.8  25.9  897  2.5  0.46  -7.7 
Busia  9  1  484.2  0.7  69.5  14.0  403  55.9  0.55  1.0 
Nandi  7  6  780.4  1.7  47.3  2.4  257  78.7  0.61  3.8 
Homa Bay  7  1  359.3  0.1  42.9  36.4  270  99.8  0.52  3.8 
Kiambu  4  1  911.3  88.0  21.4  20.6  655  94.0  0.62  5.8 
Nyandarua  1  1  587.8  95.7  49.8  3.9  159  98.8  0.45  -9.6 
Suba  1  1  190.5  0.1  51.0  17.3  169  99.2  0.59  0.5 
Baringo  0  0  357.3  7.2  59.4  1.2  39  73.5  0.62  8.2 
Bondo  0  0  294.0  0.1  25.6  8.8  280  98.2  0.46  4.7 
Gucha  0  0  571.6  0.1  67.1  8.9  849  7.2  0.40  -7.7 
Kajiado  0  0  545.3  23.8  12.1  25.5  21  12.2  0.77  21.1 
Keiyo  0  0  197.5  3.0  45.1  3.7  134  89.4  0.54  39.1 
Kilifi  0  0  710.2  0.7  65.7  21.5  127  42.7  0.47  10.4 
Kuria  0  0  201.4  0.1  57.6  3.2  312  9.6  0.41  0.5 
Kwale  0  0  645.7  1.1  72.9  32.4  68  23.4  0.57  -0.3 
Laikipia  0  0  432.5  67.8  48.1  24.3  39  71.1  0.51  25.2 
Lugari  0  0  281.7  0.8  48.0  48.3  396  26.3  0.61  -8.9 
Machakos  0  0  1,137.2  1.2  57.0  28.1  167  53.9  0.49  -2.6 
Maragwa  0  0  473.9  95.9  31.0  14.2  524  98.6  0.52  -1.6 
Marakwet  0  0  189.0  3.0  66.1  6.9  118  81.7  0.53  10.5 
Mt .Elgon  0  0  176.1  1.1  58.9  8.4  179  54.9  0.48  -8.8 
Muranga  0  0  428.3  95.9  27.9  13.7  446  98.3  0.54  -1.6 
Nyamira  0  0  615.2  0.1  46.3  4.6  656  14.5  0.50  -6.1 
Nyando  0  0  370.2  0.8  47.5  9.8  281  99.0  0.56  1.5 
Nyeri  0  0  806.5  96.6  32.4  3.5  212  98.4  0.44  7.3 
Rachuonyo  0  0  381.1  0.1  40.0  7.5  392  99.6  0.61  0.5 
Teso  0  0  237.7  0.7  58.7  9.9  385  78.9  0.46  1.0 
Thika  0  0  788.3  88.0  33.4  25.4  296  89.3  0.56  5.8 
Trans Mara  0  0  225.7  11.3  50.3  4.2  77  45.1  0.50  1.7 
West Pokot  0  0  413.7  2.7  68.7  0.0  44  75.6  0.62  4.9 
 Only districts with PEV killings, and the districts bordering these districts, are included. 
       